, 22ë is a public key cryptosystem based weakly invertible aenite automata. Weak invertibility o f F As is the key to understand and analyze this scheme. In this paper a set of algebraic terminologies describing FAs is developed, and the theory of weak invertibility o f FAs is studied. Based on this, a cryptanalysis on FAPKC is made. It is shown that the keys proposed in ë17, 18, 19, 20, 21ë for FAPKCs are insecure both in encrypting and in signing.
Introduction
Finite automaton घFAङ is a widely used concept in computer science and has several deaenitions slightly diaeerent to each other according to applications. In this context, it refers to a aenite sequential state machine, which w as studied widely, s a y for example in ë1-16ë. The action of such a machine is controlled by a clock which ticks with inputs, i.e., on receiving an input symbol, it produces an output symbol and its state transfers to a new one according to certain rules, and thus with an initial state and an input sequence of aenite length it produces an output sequence of the same length. Hence a aenite automaton is an analogue to a usual function when viewed as a transformation from input sequences to output sequences. A weakly invertible aenite automaton घWIFAङ with delay ç , or simply ç -weakly invertible aenite automaton, is such a F A that any input is uniquely determined by the corresponding state and output together with the subsequent ç outputs. That is, the input information can be recovered from the outputs after waiting ç steps, or in other words, with ç delays. WIFAs are similar to the usual injective functions in the respect that one can retrieve the input information from the outputs. However the delay ç and the state dependence make i t m uch more complicated for one to recover the input information than the usual injective functions. The aerst objective of this paper is to set up a systematic theory in dealing with the the problems such a s h o w to construct weak invertible FAs and their weak inverses, and how to routinely retrieve input information from outputs and the initial state.
FAPKC, which is a public key cryptosystem and can do both encrypting and signing, is based on weakly invertible aenite automata घWIFAsङ. FAPKC w as aerst introduced in 1985 ë17ë, named as FAPKC0. Some versions were published in 1986 ë18ë, named as FAPKC1 and FAPKC2. Then a new version was introduced in 1995 ë20ë, named as FAPKC3. Roughly speaking, in all these systems, the private key consists of two F As whose weak inverses can be easy constructed, and the public key is the composition of them. It is believed in ë18-21ë that it is hard to decompose the public key to get the private two F As and that it is hard to get a w eak inverse of the composed FA without knowing this decomposition, hence any user can encrypt messages or verify signatures using the public key, but can neither decrypt the cipher-texts nor forge the signatures without knowing its two private components. To hide the components from the composed FA, it is proposed to use boolean functions to express the composition. Then how to maintain a moderate public key size becomes a big problem, as composition would generally yield boolean expression exploding when the outer component is nonlinear. The proposed method is to restrict the input set X equal or smaller than F 8 , where F is the binary aeeld GF घ2ङ, and to restrict the nonlinear degree of the components to be small. The early versions were analysed in some papers, say in ë23, 2 4 , 25, 26ë.
The main contribution of this paper consists of two parts. In the aerst part घSection 3-5ङ, we develop a set of algebraic terminologies to describe FAs and give a systematic treatment to the weak invertibility theory on the seperable memory FAs. In the second part घSection 6-7ङ, based on the developed theory, we make a simple introduction to FAPKC and then a cryptanalysis on it. Our results show that all the keys proposed for FAPKC in ë17, 1 8 , 19, 20, 21ë are insecure both in encrypting and in signing. Before coming to the main topic, we recall some basic deaenitions in the next section.
Due to lack of space, the proofs of all the lemmas and theorems in this paper are ommited.
Basic Deaenitions
For convenience, in this section we restate some basic concepts, which can be found in ë8ë except some concepts like the natural pairs and the right ç -weak inverses.
A aenite automaton घFAङ is a pentad M = घ X; Y; S; ae; ऋ ङ where X;Y are input and output symbol sets respectively, S is the state set, X; Y and S are all aenite, ae : S ࣾ X ! S is the next state function, and ऋ : S ࣾ X ! Y is the output function. In the sequel, let X i = fx 0 x 1 ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ x i,1 jx j 2 X;0 ऊ j é i g be the set 3 Input Memory FAs and Quasi-Ring F From now on, we assume X = Y = F l घelements being written as column vectorsङ, where F = GF घ2ङ is the binary aeeld, though all the results in this paper hold true when F is any aenite aeeld. We will concentrate on the so called input memory FAs whose states are determined by some number of the past inputs घsee below for the exact deaenitionङ. Instead of investigating these FAs individually, w e study them as a whole set घthe quasi-ring Fङ endowed with some algebraic structure. That is essential to our understanding of FAs. We begin with some deaenitions. ; hऋ h 0 ; kऋ k 0 , are equivalent t o e a c h other, so we do not care the type घh; kङ, and write them by the same notation Mघaeङ, or simply by ae when there is no ambiguity.
If the function ae is of the form ae = fघt ,h ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t 0 ङ + gघu ,k ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; u ,1 ङ घ1ङ we s a y Mघaeङ i s a separable memory FA, written also as M f;g . I f g = 0 , M f;g will be called a input memory FA and will be written simply as M f ; in this case, the memory order of f = ae is simply an integer h, will be denoted by mघfङ = h. It is clear that M f;g is ç-weakly invertible if and only if M f is so, and all the problems on the weak invertibility of the separable memory FAs can be reduced to those of the input memory FAs. In order to understand the separable memory FAs, it is enough to understand the input memory FAs, so, in this paper we will mainly care about input memory FAs.
Let F be the set of all possible input memory FAs with X = Y = F l : F = ffjf = fघt ,h ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t ,1 ; t 0 ङ : X 1+h ! X;h ऋ 0; g Here t ,i = घ t ,i;1 ; t ,i;2 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t ,i;l ङ t , where t means the transpose, and t ,i;j is a variable taking the values from F.
Let f = fघt ,h ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t ,1 ; t 0 ङ; g = gघt ,h 0 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t ,1 ; t 0 ङ 2 F . Deaene the product of f and g as fg= fघgघt ,h,h 0 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t ,h ङ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; g घt ,h 0 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; t 0 ङङ
घ2ङ
The FA M fg is denoted by the notation C 0 घM g ; M f ङ in ë13ë. For any state s = घ a ,h,h 0 ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ a ,2 a ,1 ङ 2 X h+h 0 = S fg , i t i s k n o wn ë13ë that s ऎ घt; s 0 ङ 2 S f ࣾ S g ; घ3ङ where
With the above m ultiplication and the usual addition, F forms a quasi-ring, that is, these operations satisfy the laws of a ring except the right-distribution law.
Let the matrix ring M l;l घFëzëङ is embedded in F and becomes a subring of F , i t i s exactly the set of all linear FAs in F . t 0 is the identity o f F and will be identiaeed with the identity matrix I and written as 1 sometimes. Similarly, t ,i can be identiaeed with the matrix z i I and written as z i sometimes.
More generally, let F m;l be the set of input memory FAs whose output and input space have dimension m and l respectively, the set of linear FAs in F m;l can be identiaeed with M m;l घF ëzëङ. We can similarly deaene products of elements of F n;m and elements of F m;l for any n; m; l. In particular, elements in F m;l can be multiplied by elements in M n;m घF ëzëङ for any n; m; l. So the boolean expression of an element f = fघt ,h ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ ; t 0 ङ 2 F can be written as: f = CT; C 2 M l;n घFëzëङ; T = घ T 1 ; T 2 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ ; T n ङ t 2 F n;l घ4ङ where T i ; 1 ऊ i ऊ n, are distinct standard monomials, here by a standard monomial we mean a monomial of the form: Y 0ऊiऊh Y 1ऊjऊl t ai;j ,i;j ; a i;j 2 f 0; 1g such that there exists a j such that a 0;j 6 = 0, where t 0 ,i:j = 1 , t 1 ,i:j = t ,i:j . In this section we study the problem of the existence of the right w eak inverses and the problem of solving the equation determined by the operator M f घsङ. The following Lemma 1 is critical in our studies. From Lemma 1 one may draw an analogy between a WIFA and a usual map, as it is well known that a map between two aenite sets of the same size is injective if and only if it is surjective. To start with, we need to introduce a notion which generalizes the surjectiveness of the usual functions. Denote the set consisting of all possible weakly invertible elements in F by F ࣿ , and denote the set consisting of all possible ç -weakly invertible elements in F by F ࣿ ç . In this section, we study how to construct the elements in F ࣿ and how t o construct their weak inverses and the related state pairs. The last problem will be considered in Theorem 4. As will be shown, there are two t ypes of primitive weakly invertible elements, namely weakly invertible linear FAs and 0-weakly invertible FAs, they and their weak inverses can be constructed systematically घTheorem 5 and 6ङ. More elements in F ࣿ can be generated with these two t ype of primitive elements by making घaenite number ofङ the multiplicative and some proper additive operations घTheorem 7 and 8ङ. Note that 0-WIFAs have n o contribution to the information delay in such constructions, it would be interesting if one can construct systematically nonlinear WIFAs with positive delays without using any linear FAs as ingredients, but it seems a hard task.
In the sequel we denote the group consisting of all invertible l ࣾ l matrices over F ëzë b y GL l घFëzëङ, similarly for GL l घFङ : : :etc.
Theorem 4 Remark 2 For any given IMFA M f and its a ç -weak inverse M ࣿ , i n o r der to be able to construct a ç -match for each of the states in M f , it is enough to be able to construct only a single ç -pair in M ࣿ ࣾ M f according to the above Theorem.
In order to describe all the linear elements in F ࣿ , w e need the following kind of decompositions of matrices in M l;l घF ëzëङ. For any 0 6 = B 2 M l;l घFëzëङ, by using the well-known algorithm ë27ë for transforming a matrix over F ëzë i n to diagonal form, one can get a decomposition of B of the form as below, B = P D Q घ1 , zbङ घ6ङ where P 2 GL l घFëzëङ; Q 2 GL l घF ङ; b 2 M l;l घF ëzëङ and D is a l ࣾ l diagonal matrix determined by a tuple n = घ n 0 ; n 1 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; n ç ङ o f i n tegers D = diagघI n0 ; z I n1 ; z 2 I n2 ; ࣽ ࣽ ࣽ; z ç I nç ; 0 n ङ; n = l , X 0ऊiऊç n i ; ç ऋ 0; n ç é 0; n i ऋ 0 घ i é ç ङ; where I n is the n ࣾ n identity matrix, 0 n is the n ࣾ n zero matrix. The tuple n is uniquely determined by B and will be called the structure p arameter of B.
Theorem 5 ë15, 1 6 , 26ë Let It is known that F ࣿ is closed under the multiplicative operation, i.e., if f i 2 F ࣿ घi = 1 ; 2ङ, then f 2 f 1 2 F ࣿ . Moreover, we h a ve Theorem 7 Let f i 2 F , i = 1 ; 2, then f 2 f 1 2 F ࣿ if and only if f i 2 F ࣿ for i = 1 and 2. A nd in this case çघf i ङ ऊ çघf 2 f 1 ङ ऊ çघf 1 ङ + çघf 2 ङ. Remark 3 In the proposed schemes ë17, 18, 19, 20ë, there a r e some restrictions on choosing the partial state s , . These restrictions are not necessary in order to make the algorithm work, so all these restrictions have been deleted in the above description.
Now w e list the keys which are proposed in ë17, 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 21ë as follows. Form 4 ë21ë: f 0 = B 0 P 0 Q 0 ; f 1 = B 1 P 1 Q 1 or f 1 = B 1 , where B i 2 M l;l घFëzëङ, Q i 2 M l;l घFङ, each P i is a permutation on X and is determined by a exponential function of the form x 2 a +2 b which is deaened over GFघ2 l ङ, where GFघ2 l ङ i s identiaeed with X = F l in a natural way. As the outer component f 0 is nonlinear, the composition f 0 f 1 causes an exploding boolean expression, though the nonlinear degree of f 0 is just 2. In order to keep the public key size tolerable, the parameters have t o b e v ery small. The following table is copied from ë21ë to illustrate the suggested parameters and the corresponding public key sizes, where ç 0 ऊ h 0 = mघf 0 ङ; ç 1 ऊ h 1 = mघf 1 ङ, N 1 घN 2 ङ is the corresponding public key size when f 1 is linear घnonlinearङ. Remark 4 In describing the basic algorithm of FAPKC3, it is stated i n t h e section 3 of ë20ë that the outer component automaton of the public key is a memory aenite automaton, which is not neccessarily restricted t o b e of the above form 3. In this paper, we consider only the latter घi.e., form 3ङ which is stated i n the Section 4 of ë20ë in describing an implementation of FAPKC3, because in ë20ë there is neither an example nor suggested p arameters for the former except the form 3. We guess it is hard to give such an example with a tolerable public key size.
It was shown that the encrypting is insecure when the key is of the form 1 in ë23ë and of the form 2 in ë25ë. It was shown in ë26ë that both the encrypting and signing are insecure when the key is of the form 2 without the restriction घ7ङ.
Cryptanalysis on FAPKC
In this sectin we k eep the notations in the last section, and consider the following Problem 1 How to decode the ciphertexts and how to forge the signatures without knowing the private key of FAPKC?
We will show Problem 1 can be solved for any one of the keys of the form 1í4 listed in the last section, and also for the keys of the form 2 without the restriction shown in घ7ङ. The following theorem shows that f, as an arbitrary element i n F ࣿ , has a routine decomposition which will be used to reduce Problem 2. We'll say t wo elements f and g in F are similar if there exists G 2 GL l घFëzëङ such that f = Gg, written as f ' g. Theorem 10 Assume f = CT2 F ࣿ ; C2 M l;n घFëzëङ, then 1. Using the well-known method ë27ë to transform a matrix over Fëzë to a diagonal form, we may get C = BघI;0ङQ; B 2 M l;l घFëzëङ; detघBङ 6 = 0 ; Q 2 GL n घFëzëङ; घ8ङ where घI;0ङ is a matrix of size l ࣾ n, I is the identity matrix of l ࣾ l and 0 is the zero matrix of size l ࣾ घn , lङ, let f N = घ I;0ङQT, then f = Bf N , where f N is uniquely determined up to the similarity. We'll call f N the T-nonlinear factor of f, and call B the T-linear factor of f. 2 We claim that Problem 3 can be solved case by case practically by means of the divide-and-conquer searching method when the key is any one of the form 1í4 listed in the last section. To see this, we consider how large lçघfङ should be in order to resist the devide-and-conquer searching attacks on the equation of the form M f घsङx n+ç = a; a2 X n+ç . Let's see at aerst how to estimate the actual complexity of such an attack. For plain exhaustive searching, an obvious upper bound is 2 lघ1+çघfङङ , but the exact bound may b e m uch smaller. When f is linear, the logarithm of the bound to base 2 can be expressed by its structure parameters deaened in section 5, and the mean value for this expression is lघ1+çघfङङ 2 . There are no strong reasons why exhaustive searching with a nonlinear FA should be much harder than with a linear one. So, that we use 2 lघ1+çघfङङ=2 to estimate the complexity of the devide-and-conquer searching type attacks is not too pessimistic. Thus to resist such attacks to Problem 3, we should require, say, lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 é 60. Basing on Corollary 1, the parameter lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 for any one of the keys of the forms 1í3, and for any one of the suggested keys of the form 4 is estimated as below, and one can see that non of them meets the bound 60.
1. When the key is of the form 1 and the form 2, lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 = 4 . 2. When the key is of the form 3, lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 = 3 6 3. When the key is of the form 4, the parameter lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 is shown in the following table for the suggested parameters. l 7 7 5 5 3 3 3 घh 0 ; h 1 ङ घ1,14ङ घ7,8ङ घ1,19ङ घ10,10ङ घ1,34ङ घ10,25ङ घ17,18ङ lघ1+çघf N ङङ 2 52.5 31.5 50 27.5 52.5 39 28.5 From the above cryptanalysis of this section, we see all the keys proposed in ë17, 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 21ë for FAPKC are insecure both in encrypting and signing.
